Symantec accused of using 'scareware' tactics to sell full-version products | ZDNet
Symantec accused of using 'scareware' tactics to sell full-version products

By Zack Whittaker | January 11, 2012, 6:05am PST

Summary: Anti-virus maker Symantec is charged in a lawsuit with misleading users into purchasing full versions of its software by peddling ’scareware’ tactics.

Security firm Symantec is being taken to court over claims that the company’s flagship anti-malware and performance software suites mislead consumers into buying full versions of its products.

The suit, which seeks class action status, was brought by Washington state resident James Gross. It was filed in the District Court of San Jose, California on Tuesday on behalf of his lawyers, according to Reuters.

The complaint alleges that misleading ’scare’ tactics are being used by Symantec in its Norton Utilities, PC Tools Registry Mechanic, and PC Tools Performance Toolkit products. The claims also suggest the software range always report harmful errors, privacy risks and other issues that exist, regardless of whether they actually exist.

Many ’scareware’ tactics used by online scammers intercept websites and display within the browser a simulation of an anti-virus scan, that invariably tells the user that the PC they are using is infected.

“The software is falsely informing the consumer that errors are high priority and in addition it is falsely informing the consumer that their overall system health and privacy health is low”, the complaint stated.

“The truth, however, is that the scareware does not actually perform any meaningful evaluation of the user’s computer system, or of the supposed ‘errors’ detected by the software”.

One analyst said that the claims would be difficult to prove. Andy Kellett, senior analyst at Ovum, said speaking to The Inquirer: “It’s a tricky one as there are lots of unknowns, how do you prove Symantec is in the wrong?”, adding: “It’s not something that has been done before”.

The news comes only a week after Symantec confirmed an Indian hacker group hacked a “third-party” and acquired source code relating to an enterprise anti-virus solution the company once offered.

While the lawsuit will likely go Symantec’s way, it is nevertheless been a bad month for the security firm.

A Symantec spokesperson said it was “aware” of the allegations made, but declined to offer additional comment at the time of publication.
More information on MS12-004 - Security Research & Defense - Site Home - TechNet Blogs
More information on MS12-004
swiat
10 Jan 2012 10:10 AM

This month we released MS12-004 to address CVE-2012-0003 and CVE-2012-0004.

CVE-2012-0003

The most severe of these vulnerabilities is CVE-2012-0003 which is a Critical, Remote Code Execution vulnerability. This CVE affects all editions of Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008. Windows 7 is not affected by this vulnerability.

An effective workaround for CVE-2012-0003 is to disable Directshow’s MIDI parsing. Apply the following registry file would unregister the MIDI parser in Directshow.

Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00
[-HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{D51BD5A2-7548-11CF-A520-0080C77EF58A}]

CVE-2012-0004

CVE-2012-0004 is an Important-class vulnerability also involving Windows Media Player. The vulnerability in the closed caption decoding component (L21 decoder) is contained within DirectShow. Therefore, the multimedia applications that leverage DirectShow to decode closed caption streams might be affected.

As a mitigation, the latest WMP player, WMP12, has closed caption turned off by default. As shown in the below picture, the setting to display close caption content is disabled. Therefore, WMP12 users are not affected by this vulnerability by default.

Summary

MS12-004 is our top-priority bulletin for January 2012; though the mitigation described above is effective and we have seen no exploitation attempts against either of the CVEs covered, we recommend that customers apply the bulletin as soon as possible.

Special thanks to Jeremy Tinder in MSRC and Ali Rahbar in MSRC Engineering.

- Chengyun Chu, MSRC Engineering
More information on the impact of MS12-001 - Security Research & Defense - Site Home - TechNet Blogs
More information on the impact of MS12-001
swiat
10 Jan 2012 9:43 AM

Today we released MS12-001, which addresses an issue that can enable an attacker to bypass a defense in depth feature known as SafeSEH. This bypass is limited in scope to applications that make use of binaries that were built with Microsoft Visual C++ .NET 2003 RTM. Binaries that have been built with Microsoft Visual C++ .NET 2003 Service Pack 1 and beyond are not affected. In this blog post we wanted to provide more details on the issue that has been addressed and what impact it has. In addition, we’ll clarify the parameters of the “Security Feature Bypass” vulnerability category assigned to this bulletin.

What is SafeSEH?

SafeSEH is a defense–in-depth security feature that is designed to make it more difficult for attackers to exploit certain types of vulnerabilities. In particular, SafeSEH is designed to prevent attackers from using an attack technique known as an “SEH overwrite”. More details on how this is accomplished can be found in a report we released in July of last year: http://go.microsoft.com/?linkid=9776900.

Microsoft released support for SafeSEH in Visual Studio 2003 RTM. Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 were the first versions of Windows to be built with SafeSEH enabled.

What issue is being addressed?

This issue can result in SafeSEH not being enforced for a binary that has been built with support for SafeSEH. This occurs when a binary that was built with Microsoft Visual C++ .NET 2003 RTM is loaded by an application running on a version of Windows that is affected by MS12-001.

The reason that SafeSEH is not enforced in this scenario is because Microsoft Visual C++ .NET 2003 RTM produces binaries with metadata that is a different size than what the Windows loader expects. As a result, the loader conservatively falls back to assuming that the binary does not support SafeSEH. MS12-001 addresses this issue by allowing binaries to have metadata of the size that is produced by Microsoft Visual C++ .NET 2003 RTM.

What impact does this issue have?

Failing to enforce SafeSEH for a binary can enable an attacker to more easily develop an exploit for a vulnerability. The attacker must have found a vulnerability that can enable code execution for this to be possible; the issue addressed by MS12-001 does not enable code execution in and of itself. Furthermore, it does not enable elevation of privilege, information disclosure, or the like. For this reason, we’ve assigned MS12-001 to the very small category of “Security Feature Bypass” vulnerabilities. Though failure to enforce SafeSEH is by no means desirable, the issue in itself does not constitute an exploit vector.

Although the set of binaries affected by this issue is limited, some of the affected binaries are extensively used by applications. For example, the redistributable C runtime DLLs (such as msvcrt.dll) from Visual Studio 2003 are affected by this issue. These DLLs also do not enable support for ASLR and are therefore an attractive target for use in developing an exploit. EMET can be used to better mitigate these concerns by enabling mandatory ASLR and SEHOP for applications that make use of such DLLs.

Do I need to rebuild my binaries if they were built with Visual C++ 2003?

Installing the update for MS12-001 will fully address this issue without requiring any binaries to be rebuilt. Alternatively, this issue can also be resolved by rebuilding affected binaries with Microsoft Visual C++ .NET 2003 Service Pack 1 or later. You can determine if your binary is affected by this issue by using the Microsoft Visual C++ linker command “link.exe /dump /headers binary.dll”. Binaries with a Load Config Directory size of 0x48 are affected as shown below.

File Type: DLL
7.10 linker version

100000 size of heap reserve
1000 size of heap commit
0 loader flags
10 number of directories
3AC74 [ 43E0] RVA [size] of Export Directory
49298 [ 28] RVA [size] of Import Directory
52000 [ 3B8] RVA [size] of Resource Directory
0 [ 0] RVA [size] of Exception Directory
0 [ 0] RVA [size] of Certificates Directory
53000 [ 2B64] RVA [size] of Base Relocation Directory
39B48 [ 38] RVA [size] of Debug Directory
0 [ 0] RVA [size] of Architecture Directory
0 [ 0] RVA [size] of Global Pointer Directory
0 [ 0] RVA [size] of Thread Storage Directory
49078 [ 48] RVA [size] of Load Configuration Directory

Thanks to Gerardo Di Giacomo and our colleagues in Windows Sustained Engineering for their work on addressing this issue.

Matt Miller, MSEC Security Science
Symantec Investigates Possible Leak of Norton AntiVirus Source Code | Symantec Connect Community
Symantec is investigating claims by a group of hackers that they are in possession of source code for its Norton AntiVirus (NAV) product.

The group, which uses the name "The Lords of Dharmaraja," claims to have stolen Symantec source code and documentation from the servers of Indian intelligence agencies, along with intellectual property from other software companies that have contracts with the Indian government.

"As of now we start sharing with all our brothers and followers information from the Indian Military Intelligence servers," the group said in a Pastebin post on Wednesday. "So far we have discovered within the Indian Spy Programme source codes of a dozen software companies which have signed agreements with Indian TANCS programme and CBI."

The original post has been deleted from Pastebin but was still available in Google's cache. It contains a draft document describing API (application programming interface) procedures for Symantec's virus definition generation service.

According to Symantec, the leaked documentation dates back to April 1999 and is no longer relevant for its current systems.

"This document explains how the software is designed to work (what inputs are accepted and what outputs are generated) and contains function names, but there is no actual source code present," said Cris Paden, Symantec's senior manager of corporate communications.

"The information in the 1999 document has no bearing or impact on our current products, i.e., the information in the document cannot be used to impair or corrupt our current solutions," Paden added.

The hackers also said that they are in possession of source code for Norton AntiVirus, which they plan to release at a later time. "We are working out mirrors as of now since we experience extreme pressure and censorship from US and India government agencies," the group said in their Pastebin post.

To substantiate their claim, The Lords of Dharmaraja made a second post on Pastebin with a listing of files allegedly contained in the Norton AntiVirus source code package.

Symantec could not confirm whether the file listing corresponds to its source code.

"A second claim has been made by the same group regarding additional source code and we're currently investigating that. For that one, we don't have any information to provide as of yet," Paden said.

It remains to be seen if The Lords of Dharmaraja will release any actual files and what version of Norton AntiVirus, if any, will be affected. If it's current enough, the code could potentially provide malware writers with the knowledge required to evade detection, and could give Symantec's competitors an inside look into the company's technology.

If the leak turns out to be real, Symantec wouldn't be the first antivirus vendor to deal with such an incident. In January 2011, the source code for an older version of Kaspersky Antivirus was uploaded to a torrent site. The intellectual property was stolen in early 2008 by a former Kaspersky employee who attempted to sell it on the Internet. He received a three-year suspended prison sentence in Russia.

January 2012 Microsoft Black Tuesday Summary

Published: 2012-01-10,
Last Updated: 2012-01-11 12:42:11 UTC
by Adrien de Beaupre (Version: 1)
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Overview of the January 2012 Microsoft patches and their status.

# Affected Contra Indications - KB Known Exploits Microsoft rating(**) ISC rating(*)
clients servers
MS12-001 Vulnerability in Windows Kernel Could Allow Security Feature Bypass
Windows kernel
CVE-2012-0001
KB 2644615 This is a security bypass vulnerability. Exploit code likely. No known exploits. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 1
Important Important
MS12-002 Vulnerability in Windows Object Packager Could Allow Remote Code Execution
Windows Object Packager
CVE-2012-0009
KB 2603381 Exploit code likely. No known exploits. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 1
Critical Important
MS12-003 CSRSS Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
(Replaces MS11-063)
Run-Time Subsystem
CVE-2012-0005
KB 2646524 Elevation of Privilege. No known exploits. Chinese, Japanese, or Korean system locale only. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 3,1
Important Important
MS12-004 Vulnerabilities in Windows Media Could Allow Remote Code Execution
(Replaces MS10-033)
Media player
CVE-2012-0003
KB 2636391 Exploit code likely. No known exploits. Severity:Critical
Exploitability: 1,1
PATCH NOW! Critical
MS12-005 Vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Could Allow Remote Code Execution
Windows packager
CVE-2012-0013
KB 2584146 No known exploits. Exploit code likely. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 1,1
PATCH NOW! Critical
MS12-006 Vulnerability in SSL/TLS Could Allow Information Disclosure
(Replaces MS10-049)
(Replaces MS10-085)
(Replaces MS10-095)
Internet Explorer
CVE-2011-3389
KB 2643584 Publically disclosed. Information disclosure. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 3,3
Important Important
MS12-007 Vulnerability in AntiXSS Library Could Allow Information Disclosure
ASP.NET
CVE-2012-0007
KB 2607664 Information disclosure. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 3,3
Important Important
We will update issues on this page for about a week or so as they evolve.
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
(*): ISC rating
  • We use 4 levels:
    • PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
    • Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
    • Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
    • Less Urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
  • The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
  • The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
  • Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
  • All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.

(**): The exploitability rating we show is the worst of them all due to the too large number of ratings Microsoft assigns to some of the patches.

Cheers,
Adrien de Beaupré
intru-shun.ca

ISC Diary | MS11-100 DoS PoC exploit published
MS11-100 DoS PoC exploit published
Published: 2012-01-09,
Last Updated: 2012-01-09 19:21:27 UTC
by Manuel Humberto Santander Pelaez (Version: 1)
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If you have not patched yet for vulnerability MS11-100 you might want to do it ASAP, because the DoS PoC exploit for this vulnerability has been published two days ago.

More information about the vulnerability and patches at http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms11-100

Manuel Humberto Santander Peláez
SANS Internet Storm Center - Handler
Twitter: @manuelsantander
Web:http://manuel.santander.name
e-mail: msantand at isc dot sans dot org
ISC Diary | Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) PIN Brute Force Vulnerability
Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) PIN Brute Force Vulnerability
Published: 2011-12-30,
Last Updated: 2011-12-30 03:19:11 UTC
by Raul Siles (Version: 1)
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Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) is a Wi-Fi Alliance specification (v1.0 - available since January 2007) designed to ease the process of securely setup Wi-Fi devices and networks. A couple of days ago US-CERT released a new vulnerability note, VU#723755, that allows an attacker to get full access to a Wi-Fi network (such as retrieving your ultra long secret WPA2 passphrase) through a brute force attack on the WPS PIN. The vulnerability was reported by Stefan Viehböck and more details are available on the associated whitepaper. In reality, it acts as a "kind of backdoor" for Wi-Fi access points and routers.

The quick and immediate mitigation is based on disabling WPS. Your holiday gift for the people around you these days is to tell them to disable WPS.

It is important to remark that this vulnerability affects both the WPS design (which typically means higher impact and longer fix times) and the current Wi-Fi vendor implementations. The design is affected as WPS presents serious weaknesses that allow an attacker to determine if half of the PIN is correct (Do you remember Windows LANMAN (LM) authentication? 7+7 != 14). Therefore the brute force process can be split in two parts, significantly reducing the time required to brute force the entire PIN from 100 million (108) to 11,000 (104 + 103) attempts.The vendor implementations (in Wi-Fi access points and routers) are also affected due to the lack of a proper (temporarily) lock out policy after a certain number of failed attempts to guess the PIN, plus some collateral DoS conditions.

The researcher used a Python (Scapy-based) tool that has not been release yet, although other tools that allow to test for the vulnerability have been made public, such as Reaver . The current tests indicate that it would take about 4-10 hours for an attacker to brute force the 8 digit PIN (in reality 7 digit PIN, 4+3+1 digits).

Lots of Wi-Fi devices available in the market implement WPS, a significant number seem to implement the PIN authentication option (the vulnerable mechanism - called PIN External Registrar), as it seems to be a mandatory requirement in the WPS spec to become WPS certified (by the Wi-Fi Alliance), and still a very relevant number seem to have WPS enabled by default. Based on that, and the experience we had on similar Wi-Fi vulnerabilities over the last decade, it might take time to the Wi-Fi industry to fix the design flaw and release a new WPS version, it will take more time to (all) vendors to release a new firmware version that fixes or mitigates the vulnerability, and it will take even extra time to end users and companies to implement a fixed and secure WPS version and/or implementation, or to disable WPS (although this is the quickest option... we know it takes much more time than we would like :( ).

To sum up, millions of devices worldwide might be affected and it will take months (or years - think on WEP) to fix or mitigate this vulnerability... so meanwhile, it is time to start a global security awareness campaign:
Disable WPS!!

This diary extends the Wi-Fi security posture of previous ISC diaries, were we covered the security of common Wi-Fi usage scenarios, and will be complemented by two upcoming Wi-Fi security end-user awareness resources: the SANS OUCH! January 2012 issue and lesson 12 of Intypedia (both will be available on mid January 2012).

----
Raul Siles
Founder and Senior Security Analyst with Taddong
www.taddong.com
ISC Diary | ASP.Net Vulnerability
ASP.Net Vulnerability
Published: 2011-12-29,
Last Updated: 2011-12-29 20:59:55 UTC
by Richard Porter (Version: 1)
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We have been tracking this issue. Microsoft has an excellent write up on this. Some of my clients and my own company received alerts directly from Microsoft. If you are a heavy ASP.Net user please look into these issues and take proper steps for work around and patch.





MSFT is listing a WebCast on the OOB Patch [1]

Also a couple of great write ups and release. [2]

[1] https://msevents.microsoft.com/CUI/EventDetail.aspx?culture=en-US&EventID=1032502798

[2] http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms11-100
ISC Diary | Hash collisions vulnerability in web servers
Hash collisions vulnerability in web servers
Published: 2011-12-28,
Last Updated: 2011-12-28 16:34:27 UTC
by Daniel Wesemann (Version: 1)
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A new vulnerability advisory by security firm n-runs [1] describes how hash tables in PHP5,Java,ASP.NET and others can be attacked with deliberate collisions in the hash function, leading to a denial of service (DoS) on the web server in question. Microsoft have already responded with an advisory [2] of their own, other vendors are likely to follow.

[1] http://www.nruns.com/_downloads/advisory28122011.pdf
[2] http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/2659883
Keywords: DoS vulnerability webattacks webserver
ISC Diary | GlobalSign releases security incident report.
GlobalSign releases security incident report.
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Published: 2011-12-14,
Last Updated: 2011-12-14 17:39:34 UTC
by donald smith (Version: 1)
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GlobalSign released a press release today to address concerns that they may have had a compromise of their CA infrastructure.
http://www.globalsign.co.uk/company/press/121411-security-incident-report.html
They did a good job of stating what they did find and what they didn’t. They also address new measures put in place to improve their overall security posture.
“We didn't find any evidence of
* Rogue Certificates issued.
* Customer data exposed.
* Compromised GlobalSign Root Certificate keys and associated Hardware Security Modules (HSM).
* Compromised GlobalSign Certificate Authority (CA) infrastructure.
* Compromised GlobalSign Issuing Authorities and associated HSMs.
* Compromised GlobalSign Registration Authority (RA) services.

What did happen
* Peripheral web server, not part of the Certificate issuance infrastructure, hosting a public facing web property was breached.
* What could have been exposed? Publicly available HTML pages, publicly available PDFs, the SSL Certificate and key issued to www.globalsign.com.
* SSL Certificate and key for www.globalsign.com were deemed compromised and revoked. “

December 2011 Microsoft Black Tuesday Summary

Published: 2011-12-13,
Last Updated: 2011-12-14 02:29:09 UTC
by Johannes Ullrich (Version: 1)
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3 comment(s)

Overview of the December 2011 Microsoft patches and their status.

# Affected Contra Indications - KB Known Exploits Microsoft rating(**) ISC rating(*)
clients servers
MS11-087 True Type Font Remote Execution Vulnerability (Replaces MS11-077)
True Type Font Kernel Drivers
CVE-2011-3402
KB 2639417 actively exploited. Severity:Critical
Exploitability: 1
PATCH NOW! Critical
MS11-088 Elevation of Privileges in Chinese version of Microsoft Office
Microsoft Office IME (Chinese)
CVE-2011-2010
KB 2652016 no known exploits. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 1
Important N/A
MS11-089 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in Office (for OS X, replaces MS11-072 )
Microsoft Office (Windows and OS X)
CVE-2011-1983
KB 2590602 no known exploits. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 1
Critical N/A
MS11-090 Active X Kill Bits (Replaces MS11-027)
ActiveX
CVE-2011-3397
KB 2618451 no known exploits. Severity:Critical
Exploitability: 1
Critical Important
MS11-091 Remote Execution in Microsoft Publisher (Replaces MS10-103)
Microsoft Publisher
CVE-2011-1508
CVE-2011-3410
CVE-2011-3411
CVE-2011-3412
KB 2607702 vuln. is disclosed. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 1,1,2
Critical N/A
MS11-092 Remote Execution in Windows Media
Windows Media
CVE-2011-3401
KB 2648048 no known exploits. Severity:Critical
Exploitability: 1
Critical N/A
MS11-093 OLE RemoteCode Execution Vulnerability
OLE
CVE-2011-3400
KB 2624667 no known exploits. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 1
Critical N/A
MS11-094 PowerPoint Remote Execution Vulnerability (Replaces MS11-036 MS11-022 MS11-072)
Powerpoint
CVE-2011-3400
KB 2639142 no known exploits. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 2
Critical N/A
MS11-095 Vulnerability in Active Directory Could Allow Remote Code Execution (Replaces MS11-086)
Active Directory, Active Directory Application Mode, and Lightweight Directory Service
CVE- 2011-3406
KB 2640045 no known exploits. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 1
Important Important
MS11-096 Vulnerability in Microsoft Excel Could Allow Remote Code Execution (Replaces MS11-072)
Excel 2003
CVE-2010-2568
KB 2286198 Exploit code likely. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 1
Critical Important
MS11-097 Vulnerability in Windows Client/Server Run-time Subsystem Could Allow Elevation of Privilege
(Replaces MS11-010)
Run-Time Subsystem
CVE-2011-3408
KB 2620712 no known exploit. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 1
Important Important
MS11-098 Vulnerability in Windows Kernel Could Allow Elevation of Privilege
(Replaces MS10-047 MS10-021 MS11-068)
Windows Kernel
CVE-2011-2018
KB 2633171 no known exploit. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 1
Important Important
MS11-099 Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer
Internet Explorer
CVE-2011-1992
CVE-2011-2019
CVE-2011-3404
KB 2618444 no known exploit. Severity:Important
Exploitability: 3,1
Important Important
We will update issues on this page for about a week or so as they evolve.
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
(*): ISC rating
  • We use 4 levels:
    • PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
    • Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
    • Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
    • Less Urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
  • The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
  • The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
  • Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
  • All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.

(**): The exploitability rating we show is the worst of them all due to the too large number of ratings Microsoft assigns to some of the patches.

Microsoft Security Bulletin Advance Notification for December 2011
Microsoft Security Bulletin Advance Notification for December 2011

Published: Thursday, December 08, 2011

Version: 1.0

This is an advance notification of security bulletins that Microsoft is intending to release on December 13, 2011.

This bulletin advance notification will be replaced with the December bulletin summary on December 13, 2011. For more information about the bulletin advance notification service, see Microsoft Security Bulletin Advance Notification.

To receive automatic notifications whenever Microsoft Security Bulletins are issued, subscribe to Microsoft Technical Security Notifications.

Microsoft will host a webcast to address customer questions on the security bulletins on December 14, 2011, at 11:00 AM Pacific Time (US & Canada). Register now for the December Security Bulletin Webcast. After this date, this webcast is available on-demand. For more information, see Microsoft Security Bulletin Summaries and Webcasts.

Microsoft also provides information to help customers prioritize monthly security updates with any non-security, high-priority updates that are being released on the same day as the monthly security updates. Please see the section, Other Information.
ISC Diary | Newest Adobe Flash 11.1.102.55 and Previous 0 Day Exploit
Newest Adobe Flash 11.1.102.55 and Previous 0 Day Exploit
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Published: 2011-12-08,
Last Updated: 2011-12-08 21:52:32 UTC
by Adrien de Beaupre (Version: 1)
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A researcher has published some information about two new previously unknown vulnerabilities that appear to be exploitable in Adobe Flash version 11.1.102.55 and previous. Adobe has not yet released an advisory. There is no patch or workaround for the vulnerabilities. As far as I know there have not been any IDS/IPS or anti-virus signatures released yet for the exploit. On the good side this one does not yet appear to have been exploited in the wild. The major operating systems that run Flash all appear to be vulnerable. The vulnerability impacts are full compromise as the user running Flash via remote arbitrary code execution, typically delivered from a malicious web page with a crafted SWF file. Little else is known about the specific nature of the vulnerabilities. CVE CVE-2011-4693 and CVE-2011-4694 have been assigned. This will likely be another major one to keep an eye one in the near future. Particularly as Adobe scrambles to get a patch out and everyone else looks for mitigation strategies.

References:

http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1026392
http://secunia.com/advisories/47161
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2011-4693
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2011-4694

Cheers,
Adrien de Beaupré
intru-shun.ca

Microsoft November 2011 Black Tuesday Overview

2
Published: 2011-11-08,
Last Updated: 2011-11-08 22:18:48 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 2)
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Overview of the November 2011 Microsoft patches and their status.

# Affected Contra Indications - KB Known Exploits Microsoft rating(**) ISC rating(*)
clients servers
MS11-083 An integer overflow in the TCP/IP stack allows random code execution from a stream of UDP packets sent to a closed port. Permission for the attacker are at kernel level.
Replaces MS11-064.
Windows TCP/IP

CVE-2011-2013
KB 2588516 No publicly known exploits. Severity:Critical
Exploitability:2
Critical Critical
MS11-084 An input validation vulnerability in the parsing of true type fonts allows a denial of service from users with valid credentials.
Replaces MS11-077.
Kernel mode drivers

CVE-2011-2004
KB 2617657

No publicly known exploits.

Severity:Moderate
Exploitability:-
Important Less Urgent
MS11-085 Inappropriate path restriction allows Windows Mail and Windows Meeting Space to be exploited into executing random code with the rights of the logged on user.
Yet another vulnerability related to SA 2269637.
Windows Mail & Windows Meeting Space

CVE-2011-2016
KB 2620704

No publicly known exploits

Severity:Important
Exploitability:1
Critical Important
MS11-086 If Active Directory is configured to use LDAP over SSL, an attacker having a revoked certificate that is associated with a valid domain account, could get authenticated.
Replaces MS10-068.
Active Directory

CVE-2011-2014
KB 2630837
No publicly known exploits Severity:Important
Exploitability:1
Critical Critical
rereleased MS11-037 Rereleased for XP and Server 2003. To quote Microsoft's FAQ: "The new offering of this update provides systems running Windows XP or Windows Server 2003 with the same cumulative protection that is provided by this update for all other affected operating systems."
We will update issues on this page for about a week or so as they evolve.
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
(*): ISC rating
  • We use 4 levels:
    • PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
    • Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
    • Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
    • Less Urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
  • The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
  • The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
  • Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
  • All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.

(**): The exploitability rating we show is the worst of them all due to the too large number of ratings Microsoft assigns to some of the patches.

--
Swa Frantzen -- Section 66

ConfigMgr 2012 RC is out, check out the blog post below

System Center 2012 Configuration Manager Release Candidate is Here! - Microsoft Server and Cloud Platform Blog - Site Home - TechNet Blogs

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